This paper discusses two rules of definitional rejlection: The Yogical" version of definitional reflection as used in the eztended logic pmpmming language GCLA and the %"-version of definitional reflection as prqposed by Eriksson and Girard. The logical version is a Lefbintmduction rule completely analogous to the Left-introduction rules for logical operators in Gentzen-style sequent systems, whereas the w-version extends the logiml version by a principle related to the w-rule in arithmetic. Correspondingly, the interpretation of free variables diflers between the two approaches, resulting in dinemnt principles of closum of infemce rules under substitution. This difference i s crucial for the computational interpmtation of definG tional reflection.
Introduction
Suppose we equip a logical system such as intuitionistic first-order logic with a database D of clauses of the form a + C (where a is an atom and C an arbitrary formula). In a Gentzen-style sequent calculus, the normal way of handling such clauses would be to add an inference rule like where U stands for an arbitrary substitution. If C is sufficiently restricted (e.g., to Horn clauses or hereditary Harrop formulas), this principle is the basis of logic programming understood proof-theoretically (see [lo, 151) . It can also be viewed as reading the database as an inductive definition (see [9, 16] ), expressing what it means to establish an atom by reference to its defining conditions. If that way one regards (I-27) as intre ducing an atom on the right side of the turnstile, one may look for a corresponding rule (m) introducing an atom on the left side of the turnstile, in accordance with the symmetry of Gentzen-style sequent syste;m. This rule would express the closed character of the database 27 seen as a definition ("there is no further clause defining an atom"). Because of this way of reflecting upon the definition as a whole, such a principle has been called "definitional reflection" by Hallniis [9] .
Right-introduction rules for atoms like (I-D) fcrm the declarative basis of logic programming languages, in which implications are allowed to occur in clause bodies and hypothetical queries can be evaluatedthe most advanced being XProlog [15] . The computational significance of definitional reflection for lcgic programming lies in the fact that by (W) we obtain an approach to negation which is not via a meta-inference like negation by failure. If we interpret "not a" as d-1, introducing a on the left side of the turnstile means introducing negation. In particular this implies that variable bindings for negated atoms can be computed, provided, of course, that there is an sap propriate computational interpretation of definitional reflection.
There is a history of definitional reflection which includes Tnversion principles" in logic ( (13, 171) . In the context of logic programming, we have propwid such a principle in [lo] , which has been incorporated into the logic programming language GCLA (see (:l] ). A version different from that has been proposed by Eriksson [5] and by Girard [8] . It is the aim of this paper to discuss and compare these two versions. ]?or reasons to be explained they are called the "logical version" and the "w-version", respectively, of definitional reflection. In the following section we first discuss the propositional case, in which both versions do not tliffer. Certain basic problems such as cut-elimination can already be discussed there. The remaining three sections are dedicated to the differences in the treatment of variables and to computational aspects.
As the underlying logic to which we add definitional reflection we choose the following sequent calculus, of which we consider both the version with the struo turd rule of contraction and the version without contraction. Due to the possible lack of contraction we have to distinguish between two conjunctions, which we denote by A and 0 . We use I' and A to denote Due to the presence of thinning, it is sufficient to consider just one single constant for vemm and one for fulsum. Though we could do without T, it is convenient to have this constant to avoid clauses with empty bodies.
The following results extend to the cases where thinning is lacking and also to classical sequent s y s tems with multiple formulas in the succedent. Since we do not gain much for the questions under consideration, we here avoid the more complicated notation. Contraction-free logic is the basic substructural logic in our context. There is an obvious symmetry between (I-2)) and (Dl-), which is analogous to the symmetry between the Right-introduction and Left-introduction rules for logical operators. By (I-2)) an atom can be introduced on the right side of the turnstile, by (M-) on the left side. As with other pairs of rules in a sequent-style system, this symmetry can be made explicit by a local principle of cut: if an atom a has been introduced on the left and on the right side, respectively, and is then cut away: r, AI-A 1 then this cut can be reduced to a cut for a defining condition of a:
This step is also called (l-D)/(Dl-)-reduction. Similarly, we speak of (I-*)/(+)-reduction for any logical sign *. The basic reason is that in order to reduce a cut with the atomic cut-formula p , according to (kD)/(W)-reduction a cut with the more complex cut-formula p -d is generated. This situation will arise with many definitions D, since a defining condition of an atom a is of greater complexity than a, if it is not itself an atom. However, it can be shown that for certain definitions D, cut is eliminable in DR(D). It is a philosophical question whether one should insist on definitions z) being total and perhaps farce totality by requiring the underlying logic to be contraction-free (e.g., linear -this is what Girard [SI proposes). We do not think that definitions have to be total (as we do not think that computable functions have to be total). The declarative semantics of the logic programming language GCLA, for example, is based on the system DR(D) without cut, in which, as we have seen, cut is not necessarily admissible. To generelly abandon implications in clause bodies and achieve cut elimination in that way, is no viable solution, since implications in clause bodies have proved extremely useful in prooEtheoretic extensions of logic One might add that the idea of definitional reflea tion itself including the differences between its two versions discussed in the following is entirely independent of what philosophical point of view one takes with respect to cut elimination, and whether one works in a contraction-free system or not (see [ll] ). Historically, the tension between the availability of implication and contraction, which is reflected in Theorem 1 and Theurem 2, was already observed in the discussion of combinatory completeness and contraction-free logics in the early days of combinatory logic, in particular by Fit& Pr0gra"ing.
DeAnitional reflection with variables: the logical version
The two versions of definitions reflection mentioned in the introduction differ when variables are available.
We now consider atoms to be of the form p(t1, . . . , t n )
for wary predicate symbols p (including Gary propositional constants) and terms ti which are either individual variables or of the form f(tl,.. . ,tn) for wary function symbols f (including 0-ary individual constants). We extend our logical system by the usual firsborder quantifier rules:
When we apply substitutions 0,8, 7 , . . ., it is always assumed that no variable clashes can occur. In this way, we can give a kind of truth definition for all logical constants by just giving definitional clauses corresponding to the Right-introduction-rules. The Left-introduction inferences are generated by the deduction mechanism of the (Dl-)-rule. Our underlying logic is then the "metalogic" in which some object logic is defined. If we permit even variablebinding operators in addition to function symbols, we can give a truth-definition of quantification by a clause like ~((l\z)~z)*(Vz)~(~z), where ~z stands for a term with free variable 3 : (an elegant treatment would use Xterms). So in a certain sense, (DC) has the effect of the general schema for generating elimination rules from introduction rules proposed in a natural deduction setting in (191.
In Proof In the case of (Dl-) this is guaranteed by the proviso. We assume that free variables in clauses 6+C, when used with (Dl-), are always (dynamically) chosen different from the variables in I?, a and C (standardizing apart).
We call (Dk) the 'logical" version of definitional r e flection, since it resembles the Left-introduction rules for logical constants in two crucial respects: 1. (Dl-) is the exact counterpart of (I-2)) needed to ensure a (I-D)/(Dl-)-reduction. This reduction is formulated exactly as in the propositional part in section 2.
2. As in the rules for logical operators, there is just one formula being introduced by (Dl-), whereas the side formulas in l? and C remain unchanged.
This will both be different with the version considered in the next section.
We also speak of Z m l definitional reflection since the (%)-rule is a rule for introducing single atoms rather then predicates on the left side of the turnstile. For example, if 2) = .(p(l)+q,p(2)eq}, we can derive p(1)l-q and P ( 2 ) h by but not p(z)t-q. Even if we add the clause p(z)+r to D, neither p(z)l-q nor p(z)l-r is derivable, since for p ( z ) the proviso for the application of (2)I-) is not fulfilled: Whereas p ( z ) depends on r as its defining condition, substituting z with 1 or 2 gives a different defining condition (so closure under substitution as expressed by the proviso would be violated).
Theorem 3 The cut-elimination results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 also hold for definitional reflection with uaricrbles.
Proof sketch To deal with quantifiers one has to use closure under substitution (Lemma 1).
Computationally, in a logically restricted system, (Fa) corresponds to the resolution rule (when undlerstood as a proof search and not as a refutation principle). By uniwng a with heads of definitional clauses one proceeds froin l7l-a backwards to rut-Cu for some Ca E D(tw). Similarly, with (DI-), one proceeds from Here U is a joint unifier of a with a maximal set of heads of unifiers with the additional constraint that CN fulfils the proviso 2)(twe) = (D(0a) 
]).
So, computationally, one passes from the conclusion of (I-2)) or (Dl-) to a substitution instance of its p;re mi= by means of unification. However, declaratively, there is just instantiation, i.e., substitution, but no unification. This is different with another version of definitional reflection.
r,+A backwards to {rU,cot-~u : CC E D(cN)}.
The w-version of definitional reflection
We now consider the following rule of definitional 1 ' 8 flection, which has been proposed by Eriksson [5] and Girard [8].
PI-),:
{Fa, Ca l-Acr : U = m.qu(a, 6) for some b-eC E 2)) r , a F A with the proviso: The variables free in I' , &A must be different from those in the k C above the line, i.e., we always assume that variables in clauses are standardized apart. The systems DR, D and Dxf(;9)
are obtained from DR(D) and DR" (D), respectively, by replacing (Dl-) with (Dl-)u.
The motivation behind (Dl-), is that to prove m atom, it is sufficient to prove all substitution instances of its defining conditions, which are obtained by considering all mgrs of the atom with the heads of clauses in 2). Underlying is the reading of the variables of a s e quent as universally quantified from outside, i.e., rt A is intuitively interpreted as: "for each ground substitution 8, raI-Aa holds". This idea is obviously related to the w-rule in arithmetic. (See also the philosophical appendix below.) It is important to realize that mgus are used in the premisses of (%), .
Simple unifiers would not work: By using mgus, the premisses of (%), refer 1 \ )
to the defining conditions of all possible instances of a. Therefore, as Eriksson [5] has pointed out, in the higher-order case, where there is no unique mgu, complete sets of unifiers have to be considered. This is different from (Dl-), where just substitutions and not unifiers are used. To make this point more obvious, we write (Dl-) in the following form (which is just a notational variant of the formulation given in the previous section): 
DR(D), in DR,,,(D) we can derive p(x)t-q:
We simply use that q is the defining condition of each defined substitution instance of p(x) (namely of both
The standard example discussed both by Eriksson Then all axioms of general equality can be derived, for example transitivity: P(1) and P(2)). 
q(x)t--r(l)
ist not. Viewed as a tree whose nodes are labelled with the names of the inferences used, after subtitution one obtains the same tree with perhaps some branches missing. It is not trivial to extend the cut elimination r e sults from the logical version of definitional reflection to the present case, since, unlike (Dl-), (DI-), is not a Left-introduction rule in the genuine sense, i.e., not a rule dual to (I-D). There is no straightforward (I-D)/(Dl-),-reduction, since in (Dl-), the sideformulas I' and A do not remain unchanged when a is introduced on the left side of the turnstile. Rather, they occur substituted above and unsubstituted below the inference line. Due to the U occurring in the premisses of (Dl-), on both sides, (Dl-), can even be used to introduce an atom on the right side.
However, by decomposing (Dl-), into (Dl-) and some other rule, we can carry over the methods used for cut-elimination with (Dl-) to the present case. In that way we also obtain additional insight into the r e lationship between (Dl-), and (23-). Let ( w ) be the following rule. But (*) implies ru8, CuOI-AuB by closure under substitution (Lemma 3). Thus kom the sequents (*) all premisses of (Dl-), are derivable. Finally, we have to show that (U) is admissitde, if (Dl-), is given. Consider a premiss I'u,aaI-Au of i.e., the mgu of Q and b only instantiates variables in b. Thus A , &A is among the premises of (m).
All other cases of ( w ) being involved in cuts can be dealt with by permutative reductions in combins tion with closure under substitution (Lemma 3, which obviously holds for (w), too).
There is a close relationship between (Dl-)w and the completion on a definition. Suppose the definitional clauses for p in D have the following form: P(tl1, . . . , t l m ) + Cl P(t,l, -* -, trim) + c t sThen, if we add to 2) the single equality clause z=z+T, the following axiom can be derived in DKf (2) ). , .
Computational issues
If we want to extend logic programming by definitional reflection, then the logical rule (DI-) is more appropriate then (DI-),. The idea of successively computing an answer substitution, which is central to logic programming, is bound to stnmg closure under substitution, which holds for (DF) but not for (Dl-),. If we are searching an answer substitution U such that, given a query I'l-A, the sequent ral-Aa is derivable, we compose U step by step as U = 01 . . . U,. Here any U,, which is being computed at a certain stage, is viewed at the same time as (part of the) substitution of the original query. This possibility of interchanging substitution and computation, also called lifting, crucially depends on a "vertical" connection between variables, which according to Lemma 1 is available for (m), but not for (DI-),. So, for computational reasons, (Dl-), is not suitable as the basic rule of definitional reflection in an extended logic programming language.
However, (*), can play a central role in the modelling of a certain kind of quantification in such a language. Besides quantification in the "logical" sense in which the introduction of V on the right side and the introduction of 3 on the left side of the turnstile is reduced to the schematic derivability with eigenvariables, there may be "w-quantification" in the sense that VsA is reduced to Au for all substitutions U.
This corresponds to the intuition behind (w), which, according to Theorem 4, is the characteristic part of To allow for both definitional reflection with the computation of answer aubstitutions in the sense of (M-) and an interpretation of quantification in the sense of (U), Eriksson ([5]) has proposed a system with the following general rule which we call (Dl-)gm.
We distinguish between existential variables z, y, z, . . . and universal variables z*, y*, a*, . . . ("parameters") .
In the terminology of the present paper, existential variables are those for which strong closure under substitution holds and therefore answer substitutions can be computed successively (in principle). Universal variables are those for which only weak closure under substitution holds. The primitive rules for quantifiers are now formulated with universal variables z* and y* rather than z and 9. Then (M-)gm is the following rule. It is obvious that this rule adds much expressive power to extended logic programming languages, of course with many algorithmic problems of how to efficiently compute bindings at applications of (Dl-)ge,, . This can be seen as follows: Suppose we want to justify (U) by showing that, if for each ground substitution, each premiss of (U) holds, then for each ground substitution its conclusion holds, i.e., for each ground 8 : I'B,a8l-A8. We have to argue as follows: Either a8 is defined, i.e., a8 = b for some k C E D:
Then re, dl-AB is a substitution instance of a preniiss of (U). Or d is not defined: Then I'8,aOl-AB hc81ds anyway by the absurdity principle.
Therefore, if one does not accept the absurdity principle for philosophical re8sons, one cannot acoept We also considered (Dl-)U at that time, but rejecad it, since it did not seem to us appropriate for a logic programming language. Its first serious consideration was by Eriksson in a talk in May 1990 at Chalmers University (Goteborg) and at the ELP-Workshop in Stockholm in January 1991 [5] , and is investigated in detail in his thesis [6] as a special case of He gives a semantics of this rule in terms of infinitruy (variable-free) partial inductive definitions in Hallniis' sense, extends it by an induction principle and proves completeness with respect to that semantics. In August 1991 Girard presented a rule equivalent to (Dt-)w in a talk at the German workshop on Artificial Intelligence and discussed it in [8]. He considers as a rule in the framework of linear logic and motivate; it in relation to logic programming, in particular negation as failure. Cut elimination for the case of linizar logic is also mentioned.
